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MISSHAPEN DISTRICTS, MISTAKEN JURISPRUDENCE: THE 
SUPREME COURT’S DECISIONS ON PARTISAN 
GERRYMANDERING 
The evils we experience flow from the excess of democracy.  The people do not 
want virtue, but are dupes of pretended patriots. – Elbridge Gerry1 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The 2006 elections produced great change in America’s political 
landscape.  For only the second time in the last half century, control of the 
House of Representatives switched parties between the Republican Party and 
the Democratic Party.2  Despite broad discontent with President George W. 
Bush, the Iraq war and a scandal-plagued Republican party, the election was 
not as competitive as it first appears.  Out of 435 seats up for election, 317 
races had margins of victory greater than 20%.3  Sixty races were decided by 
fewer than 10% of the vote, and in only thirty-four districts did the runner-up 
finish within 5% of the vote of the winner.4  Fourteen states had no 
competitive Congressional races and thirty-five seats went completely 
uncontested.5  In California, only two of fifty-three seats were decided by 
fewer than twenty points.6  This lack of competitiveness is not a natural 
phenomenon.  At the end of the Nineteenth Century, fully half of 
 
 1. JAMES MACGREGOR BURNS & JACK WALTER PELTASON, GOVERNMENT BY THE 
PEOPLE, THE DYNAMICS OF AMERICAN NATIONAL, STATE, AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT 49 
(Prentice-Hall, 6th  ed. 1963). 
 2. Office of the Clerk, Party Divisions of the House of Representatives (1789 to Present), 
available at http://clerk.house.gov/art_history/house_history/partyDiv.html (last visited Mar. 23, 
2007). 
 3. Editorial, Redistricting Reconsidered: Does Election 2006 Show That Fears About 
Partisan Gerrymandering Were Overblown? WASH. POST, Nov. 15, 2006, at A20. 
 4. Id. 
 5. CNN.com, America Votes 2006, available at http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2006/ 
pages/results/house/full.list (last visited Mar. 18, 2007). 
 6. Id. 
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Congressional elections were decided by fewer than ten points.7  These one-
sided elections are the direct result of gerrymandering.8 
Gerrymandering is neither new nor single-minded in its purpose.  The 
word itself derives from a portmanteau of the name of Massachusetts Governor 
Elbridge Gerry and the word salamander.9  As Governor in 1812, Gerry signed 
a bill that created a salamander-shaped district designed to disadvantage his 
political opponents.10  Gerrymandering is not only deep-rooted in American 
electoral politics; it is also quite versatile.  In California, lawmakers 
successfully drew districts to maintain the status quo and to protect 
incumbents.11  In Pennsylvania, Republican legislators “kidnapped” 
Democratic Representative Frank Mascara by placing his home in the same 
district as another Democrat, John Murtha.12  The district lines came down the 
middle of his street up to his house and stopped; he lived in the eighteenth 
district but parked his car in the twelfth.13  Gerrymandering has been used to 
assure proportional representation between Democrats and Republicans,14 to 
disadvantage racial minorities,15 and to provide a district that represents 
specific interests.16 
Two developments have made gerrymandering more prevalent over the 
last few decades.  First, the Supreme Court’s decisions leading to “one-man, 
one-vote” principle17 have increased the frequency of both redistricting and 
gerrymandering.  Prior to these decisions, most states only redistricted when 
the state gained or lost a seat in the House of Representatives due to population 
shifts.18  Pursuant to these decisions, every state is required to redraw its 
 
 7. Joanne Dann, Redistricting Works Against Moderates By Creating ‘Safe’ House 
Districts, Lawmakers Encourage Hardliner Candidates, ORLANDO SENTINEL, Dec. 16, 2001, at 
G1. 
 8. In Iowa, where a nonpartisan commission draws the district map, four out of five races 
were within fifteen points.  In California, where the state legislature draws the districts, forty-
eight of fifty-three elections were decided by 20% or more.  CNN.com, supra note 5. 
 9. The Maven’s Word of the Day, Feb. 2, 1999, http://www.randomhouse.com/wotd/ 
index.pperl?date=19990202 (last visited Mar. 18, 2007). 
 10. Id. 
 11. Adam Clymer, The Nation: Democracy in Middle America; Why Iowa Has So Many Hot 
Seats, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2002, at § 4. 
 12. Jeffrey Toobin, The Great Election Grab: When Does Gerrymandering Become a Threat 
to Democracy?, NEW YORKER, Dec. 8, 2003, at 63. 
 13. Id. 
 14. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735 (1973). 
 15. Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
 16. In California, a district was created along the Pacific coast to represent the views of 
coastal residents.  This district spans over 500 miles of coast and is in some places less than 500 
yards wide.  Rachel Morris, The Race to Gerrymander: Democrats Have a Parallel Campaign to 
Win the House; It Starts in the States, WASH. MONTHLY, Nov. 2006, at 15. 
 17. Dann, supra note 7. 
 18. Id. 
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district lines every ten years according to the census.19  Frequent redistricting 
leads to more and more partisan battles over lines on a map.20  The other 
development is the growth of computer technology.  While Governor Gerry 
may have known the general area where his supporters and opponents lived, 
computers have greatly increased the precision of the gerrymander.21  Maps 
are so precise that individual blocks within neighborhoods are segmented to 
the mapmaker’s desire.22  The increased use of demographic research also 
allows a degree of precision never before imagined.  These advances have led 
to some of the most oddly shaped districts one could imagine.23 
The ability to cause drastic change simply by redistricting has led several 
states to adopt objective standards for redistricting or to employ nonpartisan 
committees to draw the maps.  Iowa is generally considered the preeminent 
model for nonpartisan districting.  Iowa’s districting is handled by the 
Legislative Service Bureau, which is prohibited from viewing partisan data 
when creating the map.24  Additionally, counties may not be split, and 
contiguity must be maintained.25  Seven states have instituted reforms in the 
districting process.26  Sixteen additional states have sponsored bills or 
constitutional amendments to take the redistricting process out of the hands of 
the state legislature. 27 
Gerrymandering, in its various forms, has been around for nearly two 
centuries, but its modern use has become more effective and divisive.  In the 
 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. 
 21. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 312 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring); id. at 345 
(Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 364 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Toobin, supra note 12; Clymer, supra 
note 11; Dann, supra note 7. 
 22. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 364 (Breyer, J., dissenting); Toobin, supra note 12. 
 23. For pictures of gerrymandered maps, see generally CNN.com, America Votes 2006 
House Map,  http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2006/pages/results/house/map.html (map of entire 
country); see, e.g., Tennessee Congressional Districts, http://rangevoting.org/TN_CDloc.pdf (map 
of Tennessee—note Districts 3 and 7); Congressional Districts Compared, http://rangevoting.org/ 
TexasRedist.jpg (map of Texas before and after the 2003 redistricting); The Pennsylvania 
Marketing and Planning Center, PA—Before and After the 2001 Reapportionment, 
http://www.mapcenter.org/region/gerrymaps.html (map of Pennsylvania before and after the 2001 
redistricting); Gerry’s Gallery, http://www.westmiller.com/fairvote2k/in_gerry.htm (collection of 
bizarrely-shaped districts) (all websites last visited Mar. 18, 2007). 
 24. Dann, supra note 7. 
 25. Id. 
 26. HAW. REV. STAT § 25-2 (1993); IDAHO CODE ANN. § 72-1506 (2006); IOWA CODE § 
42.4(5) (2003); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 21-A, §§ 1206, 1206-A (2003); MONT. CODE ANN. § 5-
1-115 (2003); N.J. CONST. art. II, § 2; WASH. REV. CODE § 44.05.090 (1994). 
 27. California, Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, 
Nevada, New Hampshire, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Virginia.  
Redistricting Reform Watch, http://www.fairvote.org/index.php?page=1389 (last visited Mar. 18, 
2007). 
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past, redistricting occurred, at most, once a decade.  While the partisan battles 
were fierce, they were limited.  In 2003, the Texas legislature attempted to 
redistrict for the second time in the decade.28  If the political gambit worked, 
the Texas legislature would have forever changed the future of 
gerrymandering. 
This comment will first present the facts and procedural history of League 
of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry.  Then it will trace the history of 
partisan gerrymandering29 via the Supreme Court’s chief opinions in Davis v. 
Bandemer (“Bandemer”), Vieth v. Jubelirer (“Vieth”), and League of United 
Latin American Citizens v. Perry (“League”).  Each opinion will be critiqued 
regarding the guidance it gives the lower courts and the limitations it would 
place on the state legislatures.  This comment will also discuss and explain the 
rationale for declaring partisan gerrymandering justiciable.  Finally, this 
comment will set forth a standard for when mid-decade redistricting and 
partisan gerrymanders are unconstitutional. 
II.  FACTS OF LEAGUE 
In the summer of 2006, the Supreme Court issued its controversial decision 
in League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry30 approving the blatant 
partisan gerrymandering that occurred in Texas during 2003.  The case’s 
background is convoluted yet intriguing.  In 1990, the decennial census 
resulted in Texas receiving thirty seats in the House of Representatives—an 
increase of three seats from the previous decade.31  Accordingly, the 
Democratically-controlled Texas Legislature redrew the Congressional district 
map.32  Using the current but diminishing Democratic majority and newly 
emerging computer software, the Democrats designed what has been called the 
“shrewdest gerrymander of the 1990’s.”33  The results of this map were 
remarkable.  In 2000, using the still applicable 1990 map, Texas Democrats 
lost the governorship and control of the State Senate and only carried 41% of 
the vote for statewide offices, yet still won seventeen of the thirty 
Congressional seats.34 
 
 28. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2606 (2006). 
 29. “Partisan gerrymandering” and “political gerrymandering” are both used to describe the 
same phenomenon.  Unless taken from a direct quote, this comment will use “partisan 
gerrymandering.” 
 30. League of United Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. 2594. 
 31. Id. at 2605. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. (quoting M. BARONE & R. COHEN, ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 2004 1510 
(2003). 
 34. Id. at 2605-06. 
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The 2000 census led to an increase of two more Congressional seats for 
Texas, bringing the state’s total number of seats to thirty-two.35  Once again, 
the legislature was charged with redrawing the state’s district map.36  Due to 
the fact that the Republicans controlled the State Senate and the Democrats 
controlled the State House of Representatives, the legislature was unable to 
come to a consensus on changes to district boundaries.37 
The “unwelcome obligation” of redrawing the map was left to a three-
judge panel of federal judges in the Eastern District of Texas.38  In Balderas v. 
Texas, the district court enacted what is known as Plan 1151C.39  The court 
applied “only ‘neutral’ redistricting standards” when it drew the new map.40  
These standards included placing new districts in high-growth areas, applying 
county and voting precinct lines, and avoiding pairing incumbents in the same 
district.41  Then, the Balderas court conformed the map to the one person-one 
vote principle.42 
In the 2002 Congressional election, Republicans did not win as many seats 
as they had expected.43  Despite winning 59% of the vote in statewide 
elections, Texas Republicans were elected to only a minority of Texas’s seats 
in the U.S. House.44  The Republicans, however, did gain a majority in the 
Texas House of Representatives, which gave them control of both houses of 
the state legislature and the governorship.45 
The Republicans then began their quest to gain seats in Congress through a 
mid-decade redistricting.46  “There is little question but that the single-minded 
purpose of the Texas Legislature in enacting Plan 1374C was to gain partisan 
advantage.”47  To prevent redistricting, Democratic members of the Texas 
House of Representatives absented themselves in order to frustrate quorum 
 
 35. Id. at 2628 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 36. League of United Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2628 (Stevens, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. (quoting Balderas v. Texas, No. 6:01CV158, 2001 WL 35673966 (E.D. Tex. Nov. 14, 
2001) (per curium)). 
 39. Id. at 2606 (plurality opinion). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. League of United Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2606. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id.  Texas Republicans received fifteen of thirty-two Congressional seats.  The majority 
opinion League does not take into account incumbency as a reason that the court-enforced plan 
may not have immediately resulted in a Republican majority. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id.; id. at 2629 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 47. Id. at 2606 (plurality opinion) (quoting Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 470 (E.D. 
Tex. 2004)); id. at 2629 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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requirements.48  After the legislature failed to redistrict during the regular 
session, Republican Governor Rick Perry called a special session to redraw the 
district maps—an act he refused to do in 2001.49  The House soon approved a 
new map, but the Democratic Senators took advantage of a long-standing 
tradition that allowed a filibuster unless overruled by two-thirds of the 
Senators.50 
During a second special session, Lieutenant Governor David Dewhurst 
suspended operation of the Senate filibuster.51  Every Democratic Senator then 
left the state to prevent a quorum in the second special session.52  After the 
return of a lone Democratic State Senator, Governor Perry called a third 
special session to approve a new map.53  During this session, the Texas 
legislature approved Plan 1374C, which was the subject of League.54 
Plan 1374C dramatically changed the landscape of the Texas districting 
map.  Over one third of the state’s population was shifted to different districts 
than under Plan 1151C.55  Additionally, the newly drawn districts were on the 
whole less compact56 than under the previous plan.57 
A. Procedural History 
Soon after Plan 1374C was enacted by the state, several lawsuits were filed 
claiming that the redistricting was unconstitutional.58  A coalition comprised of 
voters, interest groups, members of Congress, and a city claimed that Plan 
1374C violated the Census, Elections, and Equal Protections Clauses of the 
U.S. Constitution and the Voting Rights Act.59  The District Court for the 
 
 48. League of United Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2630 (Stevens, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. League of United Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2630 (Stevens, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
 55. Eight million residents of Texas were redrawn into different districts.  Id.  The 
population of Texas as of 2000 was 20,851,820. U.S. Census Bureau, State & County Quick 
Facts: Texas, available at http://quickfacts.census.gov/qfd/states/48000.html (last visited Mar. 23, 
2007). 
 56. Compactness is often used as an objective standard to prove gerrymandering.  
“Compactness” can be determined by several methods, including the ratio of the area of a district 
to the area of the smallest circle that would fit around the entire district or the ratio of the area to 
the perimeter.  Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 348 n.3 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 57. League of United Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2630-31 (Stevens, J., concurring 
in part and dissenting in part). 
 58. Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451 (E.D. Tex. 2004) (per curiam). 
 59. Id. at 457. 
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Eastern District of Texas entered judgment against the plaintiffs.60  The 
plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court, which remanded all the cases back to 
the district court to decide the issue in light of Vieth v. Jubelirer.61  On remand, 
the district court again rejected the plaintiffs’ claims.62 
III.  DISCUSSION 
The Supreme Court’s decision in League is nothing short of convoluted.  
In total, the case contains six different opinions and over seventy-five pages.63  
Every Justice dissented or separately concurred in part to at least one portion of 
the plurality opinion, and only two Parts of Justice Kennedy’s opinion received 
enough support to garner a majority.64  The opinion decided three different 
issues: (1) whether the statewide districting plan was unconstitutional; (2) 
whether the district map was unconstitutional as to Districts 23 and 25 under 
Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act; and (3) whether the district map was 
unconstitutional as to District 24 under Sections 2 and 5 of the Voting Rights 
Act.65  Due to the multitude of highly specific issues in the case, this comment 
will focus only on the claim that partisan gerrymandering is unconstitutional.  
The comment will not, therefore, address any of the specific claims made by 
the plaintiffs as to Districts 23, 24, or 25. 
A. Davis v. Bandemer 
Prior to League, the Supreme Court first discussed statewide partisan 
gerrymandering in Davis v. Bandemer.66  In Bandemer, the Republican-
controlled Indiana legislature reapportioned its districts for both houses of the 
state legislature.67  In the 1982 election, Democratic candidates received a 
majority of the total votes in the state House but failed to elect a majority of 
 
 60. Id.; League of United Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2607. 
 61. League of United Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2607.  The following cases were 
joined and decided together on remand in Henderson and in the Supreme Court in League: Lee v. 
Perry, 126 S.Ct. 2978 (2006); GI Forum of Texas v. Perry, 126 S.Ct. 829 (2005); Jackson v. 
Perry, 126 S.Ct. 827 (2005); Travis County, Tex. v. Perry 126 S.Ct. 827 (2005); League of United 
Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 126 S.Ct. 827 (2005).  In addition, the cases of Henderson v. 
Perry, 126 S.Ct. 2976 (2006), and Soechting v. Perry, 126 S.Ct. 2978 (2006), were decided on the 
same day as League of United Latin American Citizens and under the same rationale. 
 62. League of United Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2607. 
 63. See generally id. 
 64. Parts II-A and III were the Opinion of the Court.  Id. at 2594, 2604. 
 65. The plurality held that District 23 was illegal as it violated § 2 of the Voting Rights Act 
(Kennedy, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, and Stevens concurred at least in the judgment, with 
Roberts, Alito, Scalia and Thomas dissenting).  The plurality held that District 24 was not 
unconstitutional (Kennedy, Roberts, Alito, Scalia and Thomas concurred in the judgment, with 
Stevens, Breyer, Souter, and Ginsburg filing three different dissents).  Id. at 2626. 
 66. Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109 (1986). 
 67. Id. at 113. 
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seats.68  Prior to the election, several Indiana Democrats filed suit, claiming 
that the reapportionment constituted a partisan gerrymander which violated the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.69  Based on the 
legislature’s discriminatory intent and the discriminatory effect, as evidenced 
by the 1982 elections, the district court invalidated the plan.70 
The Supreme Court decided two major issues in Bandemer.  The first issue 
was whether partisan gerrymandering was a justiciable question.71  The 
defendants in the case argued that the case was non-justiciable because it was a 
political question.72  Following Baker v. Carr, the Court stated: 
Prominent on the surface of any case held to involve a political question is 
found [1] a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the issue to 
coordinate political department; or [2] a lack of justiciably discoverable and 
manageable standards for resolving it; or [3] the impossibility of deciding 
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial 
discretion; or [4] the impossibility of a court’s undertaking independent 
resolution without expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of 
government; or [5] an unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political 
decision already made; or [6] the potentiality of embarrassment from 
multifarious pronouncements by various departments on one question. . . .  
Unless one of these formulations is inextricable from the case at bar, there 
should be no dismissal for nonjusticiability on the ground of a political 
question’s presence.73 
The Court dismissed most of the political question factors as inapplicable to 
the facts.74  The majority held that since none of the Carr factors were present, 
partisan gerrymandering was justiciable.75 
Justice O’Connor, joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist, 
concurred only in the judgment because there were no judicially manageable 
standards.76  O’Connor dismissed the plurality’s standard as not judicially 
manageable because it would require a court to make an analysis of the proper 
proportionality of a reapportionment.77  Since no judicially manageable 
standard existed, partisan gerrymandering was a political question and was 
thus non-justiciable.78 
 
 68. Id. at 115. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 115-16. 
 71. Id. at 118. 
 72. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 118. 
 73. Id. at 121-22 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962)). 
 74. Id. at 122-23. 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. at 147 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 77. Id. at 155-61. 
 78. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 160. 
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The second question in Bandemer was what standard should be used to 
determine whether a partisan gerrymander has impermissibly violated the 
Equal Protection Clause.  The majority on the issue of justiciability could not 
reach a consensus on an appropriate standard.  According to the plurality,79 the 
plaintiffs must prove there was “intentional discrimination against an 
identifiable political group and an actual discriminatory effect on that group.”80  
If the plaintiffs meet this threshold question, the court should examine the 
legislation for valid underpinnings.81  The Bandemer plaintiffs did not pass the 
threshold question of effect, so the Court did not address any of the other 
issues.82 
In his dissent, Justice Powell, joined by Justice Stevens, argued for a 
broader standard based on several “neutral” criteria.83  The most important 
criteria were the district’s shape and the district’s adherence to established 
subdivisions, such as counties, cities, or school districts.84  Other factors 
include the legislative process, legislative goals, population disparities, and 
vote dilution.85  No one factor could be dispositive, but the cumulative effect 
would be to determine the “fairness of a redistricting plan.”86  Based on the 
application of the facts to these factors, Justice Powell determined that the 
redistricting plan in Indiana violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.87 
A majority in Bandemer recognized that the Constitution offers protection 
against partisan gerrymanders; however, a majority failed to craft a workable 
standard to determine when such an impermissible gerrymander occurs.  The 
standard proposed by the plurality eventually proved too strict to provide any 
actual relief for citizens whose votes were nullified by partisan gerrymanders 
and relief was denied in every claim of partisan gerrymander that followed 
Bandemer.88  While the Supreme Court concluded that the Constitution 
precludes partisan gerrymanders, there proved to be no actual check on the 
redistricting process.  Bandemer failed because the Court punted its 
opportunity to control an unconstitutional legislative practice by advocating a 
standard that provides no actual relief. 
 
 79. Justices White, Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun.  Id. at 113. 
 80. Id. at 127. 
 81. Id. at 141. 
 82. Id. at 141-42. 
 83. Id. at 162 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
 84. Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 173. 
 85. Id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 184-85. 
 88. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 279 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
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B. Vieth v. Jubelirer 
Unsurprisingly, the Court’s opinions in Bandemer did not end the question 
of the constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering.  The Supreme Court next 
visited the issue of partisan gerrymandering in Vieth v. Jubelirer.89  In Vieth, 
the plurality opinion,90 written by Justice Scalia and joined by Chief Justice 
Rehnquist and Justices Thomas and O’Connor, sought to overturn Bandemer.91  
Since judicial relief was denied in every case between Bandemer and Vieth, the 
Bandemer plurality standard had proven unmanageable because it provided 
virtually no guidance for the lower courts.92  The number and variety of 
proposed standards were evidence that no standard is judicially manageable.93 
The plurality argued partisan gerrymanders are non-justiciable because no 
judicially manageable standard exists to decide the constitutionality of such 
causes of action.94  In order to prove this argument, the plurality dismissed 
each proposed standard.95  This comment will, therefore, describe each 
proposed standard, followed by the plurality’s rationale for dismissing each 
standard. 
1. Powell’s Bandemer standard 
The plurality rejected Justice Powell’s standard from his dissent in 
Bandemer.96  The plurality described Powell’s standard as “a totality-of-the-
circumstances analysis, where all conceivable factors, none of which is 
dispositive, are weighed with an eye to ascertaining whether the particular 
gerrymander . . . is not ‘fair.’”97  The plurality dismissed Powell’s “fairness” 
standard without justification, stating only that “[s]ome criterion more solid . . . 
seems to us necessary to enable the state legislatures to discern the limits of 
 
 89. See generally id. 
 90. The four-justice plurality held that partisan gerrymanders are non-justiciable, but the 
other five justices, for differing reasons, held the case to be justiciable.  See id.  Justice Kennedy 
concurred in the judgment of the plurality.  Id. at 267, 269. 
 91. Id. at 281. 
 92. Id. at 279-280, 282-83. 
 93. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 292.  “We preface [our consideration of the dissenter’s standards] with 
the observation that the mere fact that these four dissenters come up with three different 
standards—all of them different from the two proposed in Bandemer and the one proposed here 
by appellants—goes a long way to establishing that there is no constitutionally discernible 
standard.” Id.; but see id. at 368 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“Members of a majority might well seek 
to reconcile such differences.  But dissenters might instead believe that the more thorough, 
specific reasoning that accompanies separate statements will stimulate further discussion.  And 
that discussion could lead to change in the law, where, as here, one member of the majority, 
disagreeing with the plurality as to justiciability, remains in search of appropriate standards.”). 
 94. Id. at 281 (plurality opinion). 
 95. Id. at 281-305. 
 96. Id. at 290-91. 
 97. Id. at 291. 
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their districting discretion.”98  The plurality’s rationale for dismissing Powell’s 
Bandemer standard is unconvincing.  “Fairness” has been used by the Court in 
other areas of the law such as personal jurisdiction and due process. 99  The 
broad standard proposed by Powell would likely lead to effective limitations of 
partisan gerrymandering.  “Fairness” as a standard, however, could make 
consistency in the district courts difficult. 
2. Plaintiffs’ Vieth standard 
The plurality also considered and rejected a standard proposed by the 
plaintiffs.100  The plaintiffs’ standard maintained but modified the two prong 
intent/effects test from Bandemer.101  The plaintiffs’ standard required the 
predominant intent of the legislature be to political gerrymander.102  The 
plurality dismissed this standard because it was unable to determine the 
predominant intent of a legislative body.103 
Under the plaintiffs’ test, “[t]he requisite effect is established when (1) the 
plaintiffs show that the districts systematically ‘pack’ and ‘crack’ the rival 
party’s voters, and (2) the court’s examination of the ‘totality of 
circumstances’ confirms that the map can thwart the plaintiffs’ ability to 
translate a majority of votes into a majority of seats.”104  The plurality denied 
this part of the standard because the Constitution “guarantees equal protection 
of the law [only] to persons, [and] not equal representation in government to 
equivalently sized groups.”105  Furthermore, even neutral districting schemes 
could result in packing and cracking and a majority of statewide votes not 
translating into a majority of seats.106 
The plaintiffs’ standard fails in both guidance and limitations.  The 
Bandemer plurality standard demonstrated that the intent/effects test is too 
narrow.  The modifications would not accomplish the necessary broadening of 
 
 98. Id. 
 99. While Justice Scalia believed that “fairness” was too indeterminate to be used as a 
standard, previous opinions by the Supreme Court have used just such a standard.  See id.  The 
Court used a standard of fairness in personal jurisdiction and Due Process claims. See, e.g., Rush 
v. Savchuk, 444 U.S. 320, 328 (1980) (personal jurisdiction); Clark v. Arizona, 126 S. Ct. 2709, 
2732 (2006) (due process).  Justice Scalia provided no rationale for why “fairness” was an 
appropriate standard in those cases but failed in partisan gerrymandering cases.  See generally 
Rush , 444 U.S. at 328; Clark, 126 S. Ct. at 2732. 
 100. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 284-90. 
 101. Id. at 284. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. at 284-85. 
 104. Id. at 286-87 (internal quotes omitted) (emphasis in original). 
 105. Id. at 288. 
 106. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 289.  The Court failed to address that where unintentional packing and 
cracking occurs, there would be no problem because the map would pass the intent prong of the 
analysis. 
SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 
400 SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY PUBLIC LAW REVIEW [Vol. 26:389 
the test to make it effective in limiting the legislatures.  Additionally, little 
guidance is provided to the lower courts on how to administer this test. 
3. Justice Kennedy’s concurrence 
Justice Kennedy concurred with the judgment of the plurality but refrained 
from finding that partisan gerrymandering is non-justiciable.107  His basic 
argument was that even though he could not currently determine a judicially 
manageable standard, he would not now foreclose all future claims because of 
the alleged infringement to constitutional rights.108  He reasoned that since the 
judiciary is willing to enter the districting fray for other scenarios, such as one 
person-one vote and racial gerrymandering, partisan gerrymandering is 
justiciable.109  Finally, he believed that eighteen years of one unworkable 
standard did not prove that there was no workable standard available.110 
The plurality rejected Kennedy’s concurrence as illogical and illegal.111  
The concurrence is illogical because it followed all the rationale for non-
justiciability but failed to follow it through to that logical conclusion.112  The 
plurality opinion suggested that lower courts treat Kennedy’s concurrence as a 
“reluctant fifth vote against justiciability.”113 
Justice Kennedy recognized that partisan gerrymandering is a 
constitutional problem, but his lack of standard provides no guidance 
whatsoever to the lower courts.  Furthermore, his opinion does nothing to curb 
partisan gerrymandering now or in the future. 
4. Justice Stevens’ dissent 
Justice Stevens put forth a standard for determining unconstitutional 
partisan gerrymanders.  Stevens’ standard was based on the idea that when the 
state legislature’s sole motivation is partisanship, without any pretense of 
neutrality, the legislature violates its requirement to govern impartially.114 
Justice Stevens followed the standards set forth by the Court in various 
racial gerrymandering cases.115  Therefore, based on the standing requirements 
 
 107. Id. at 309 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
 108. Id. at 309-10. 
 109. Id. at 310-11. 
 110. Id. at 311-12. 
 111. Id. at 301 (plurality opinion).  The plurality believed Kennedy’s opinion was illegal 
because it neither affirmed the district court, finding the claims justiciable but failing to meet a 
standard for unconstitutionality, nor did it reverse, finding the claims non-justiciable.  Id. 
 112. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 301. 
 113. Id. at 305. 
 114. Id. at 317-18 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 115. Id. at 327 (“in my view, racial and political gerrymanders are species of the same 
constitutional concern”); see generally Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899 (1996); United States v. 
Hays, 515 U.S. 737, 745 (1995); Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
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in the racial gerrymandering cases, he believed that there was no standing for a 
statewide claim of partisan gerrymandering.116  A plaintiff, therefore, must 
reside in a challenged district and allege a specific type of “representational 
harm”117—namely that the winner of the gerrymandered district does not 
represent the whole district but only those responsible for its gerrymandered 
win.118 
[The] danger of a partisan gerrymander is that the representative will perceive 
that the people who put her in power are those who drew the map rather than 
those who cast ballots, and she will feel beholden not to a subset of her 
constituency, but to no part of her constituency at all.  The problem, simply 
put, is that the will of the cartographers rather than the will of the people will 
govern.119 
Assuming the plaintiff has standing to challenge the district, the plaintiff 
must allege and prove that the district is an unusual shape,120 irregular,121 
peculiar,122 or bizarre,123  such as “an uncouth twenty-eight-sided figure.”124  
The irregular district alone is not a constitutional violation; the plaintiff must 
also show that politics and partisanship were the predominant factors in the 
legislature’s decision.125  Other neutral districting principles, such as 
compactness, contiguity, and respect for political subdivisions are objective 
factors that may defeat a claim of partisan gerrymandering.126  Foremost in 
Stevens’ opinion was the intent of the legislature—whether it “allowed 
partisan considerations to dominate and control the lines drawn, forsaking all 
neutral principles. . . .  [I]f no neutral criterion can be identified to justify the 
lines drawn, and if the only possible explanation for a district’s bizarre shape is 
 
 116. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 327 (Stevens, J., dissenting).  Citizens challenging districting schemes 
must reside in the districts that they challenge.  Id. Stevens based this view on stare decisis from 
Shaw v. Reno but would not suggest that a plaintiff would never have standing. Id. at 327, n.16. 
 117. Id. at 330 (citing Hays, 515 U.S. at 745). 
 118. Id. at 329.  “When a district obviously is created solely to effectuate the perceived 
common interests of one racial group, elected officials are more likely to believe that their 
primary obligation is to represent only the members of that group, rather than their constituency 
as whole.  This is altogether antithetical to our system of representative democracy.”  Reno, 509 
U.S. at 648.  “Gerrymanders subvert that representative norm because the winner of an election in 
a gerrymandered district inevitably will infer that her success is primarily attributable to the 
architect of the district rather than to a constituency defined by neutral principles.” Vieth, 541 
U.S. at 330 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 119. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 331. 
 120. Id. at 321 n.21. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
 123. Id. 
 124. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 321 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citing Gomillon v. Lightfoot, 364 US 
339, 340 (1960)). 
 125. Id. at 335 (citing Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 913 (1995)). 
 126. Id. (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993)). 
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a naked desire to increase partisan strength, then no rational basis exists to 
save the district.”127 
The plurality dismissed Justice Steven’s view that partisan gerrymandering 
cases should follow racial gerrymandering cases because racial 
gerrymandering is too distinct from partisan gerrymandering.128  The 
plurality’s rationale was that districting based on political entities is 
contemplated and approved by the Constitution,129  whereas districting by race 
is unlawful.130  Moreover, political affiliation “is rarely as readily 
discernible—and never as permanently discernible—as a person’s race.  
Political affiliation is not an immutable characteristic, but may shift from one 
election to the next.”131  In sum, the plurality rejected Stevens’ standard not 
because it is unmanageable, but because the accepted rationale for racial 
gerrymandering does not apply to partisan gerrymandering.132 
Justice Stevens’ standard would definitely provide manageable standards 
for the lower courts because the courts already apply these standards to cases 
of racial gerrymandering.  However, the standard would likely fail in its 
purpose of restricting partisan gerrymandering.  Partisan gerrymandering does 
not occur district-by-district.  The legislatures manipulate the entire map, not 
just individual districts.  Furthermore, his requirement that districts forsake all 
neutral principles is unreasonable because districts could be gerrymandered, 
while maintaining a single neutral districting principle, such as incumbent 
protection,133 geographical features,134 or one person-one vote. 
5. Justice Souter’s135 dissent 
Justice Souter’s dissent laid out a distinct and sophisticated test based on 
the burden shifting standard first established in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. 
Green.136  Plaintiffs must prove a prima case with five elements.137  First, 
plaintiffs must show that they identify with a cohesive political group.138  
Second, plaintiffs must show that their district “paid little or no heed to those 
traditional districting principles whose disregard can be shown 
 
 127. Id. at 339 (emphasis added). 
 128. Id. at 285-86 (plurality opinion). 
 129. Id. at 285; see also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4. 
 130. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 286. 
 131. Id. at 287 (emphasis in original). 
 132. Id. at 295.  “This Court may not willy-nilly apply standards—even manageable 
standards—having no relation to constitutional harms.”  Id. 
 133. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 754 (1973). 
 134. Morris, supra note 16. 
 135. Opinion joined by Justice Ginsburg.  Vieth, 541 U.S. at 342 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 136. Id. at 346; see generally McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). 
 137. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 347 (Souter, J., dissenting).  For simplicity’s sake, Justice Souter 
would only apply this test to single member districts.  Id. at 346-47. 
 138. Id. at 347. 
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straightforwardly: contiguity, compactness, respect for political subdivisions, 
and conformity with geographic features like rivers and mountains.”139  Third, 
plaintiffs need to show how the unusual shape of the district helped or hurt one 
party over the other.140  Plaintiffs must show why specific lines were drawn, 
based on the lines and the demographics of the area.141  The overall plan 
should compel an inference that the shape of the district was based on the 
distribution of the plaintiff’s group.142  Fourth, plaintiffs must present a 
hypothetical district which would alleviate the problem of the gerrymander and 
more closely follow traditional districting standards than the actual district.143  
Finally, plaintiffs must show that the defendants intentionally manipulated the 
district to pack144 or crack145 the district.146 
Once plaintiffs meet these five criteria, the burden shifts to the defendants 
who must show that the decisions were not based on “naked partisan 
advantage.”147  The state could show that the neutral objectives could not be 
better served by the hypothetical district, or it could affirmatively establish 
legitimate objectives, such as to avoid racial dilution, one person-one vote 
compliance, proportional representation, or other legitimate objectives.148  
Justice Souter chose to postpone any definition for a statewide claim until the 
Court has the benefit of analyzing the district specific claims.149 
The plurality rejected Justice Souter’s standard as more complicated but 
equally unworkable.150  While the tests are broken down, they are still 
unanswerable because the question remains as to how much is too much.151  
The plurality stated that each of the last four prima facie “steps requires a 
quantifying judgment that is unguided and ill suited to the development of 
judicial standards.”152  Justice Souter countered this argument by stating that 
 
 139. Id. at 347-48. 
 140. Id. at 349. 
 141. Id.  The plaintiffs “would need to point to specific protuberances . . . that reach out to 
include Democrats, or fissures in it that squirm away from Republicans.” Id. 
 142. Id. 
 143. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 349 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 144. “Pack” means to intentionally place a super-majority of members of one party in a 
district, in order that all the votes go to only one candidate.  Id. at 286 n.7 (plurality opinion). 
 145. “Cracking” involves splitting a pocket of members who may form a majority in a district 
in order that they form a safe minority in several districts.  Id. 
 146. Id. at 350 (Souter, J., dissenting).  Justice Souter noted that intent was easily proved as 
the legislature is not politically naïve, but he would only apply intent when the gerrymandering 
party controls both houses and the governorship or is veto-proof by an adversarial governor.  Id. 
 147. Id. at 351. 
 148. Id. at 351-52. 
 149. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 353 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 150. Id. at 296-97 (plurality opinion). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. at 296. 
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while the test may allow some partisan gerrymandering, it “does not make it 
impossible for courts to identify at least the worst cases of gerrymandering, 
and to provide a remedy.  The most the plurality can show is that my approach 
would not catch them all.”153 
The standard proposed by Justice Souter would work on both judicial 
guidance and legislative limitations.  The lower courts would have five distinct 
elements to determine rather than the two-pronged intent/effects test.  The 
standard succeeds because it uses a presumption to shift the burden once the 
plaintiff has met the prima facie case.  It removes the difficult burden on the 
plaintiff to prove the intent of the legislature.  Importantly, if the state has a 
legitimate state interest that cannot be met with another map, then the district 
will be approved.  The standard fails on one level because it provides relief 
only for individual districts and not for a statewide map.  As stated above, 
partisan gerrymandering usually occurs on the statewide level, rather than 
district by district. 
6. Justice Breyer’s dissent 
Justice Breyer first focused on what the plurality described as the 
impossible problem, determining what the court is testing for.154  He stated that 
the Constitution, through its guarantee of democratic government, must 
provide “a method for transforming the will of the majority into effective 
government.”155  Moreover, given the use of single-member districts in the 
United States, political ramifications in districting are not only necessary but 
beneficial.156  Therefore, the use of political considerations, by itself, does not 
violate the Constitution because it is justified by desirable goals, such as 
minority party representation and stable legislatures.157 
While the use of political considerations is beneficial in some 
circumstances, it can lead to serious abuse when it results in unjustified 
entrenchment of a minority party in power.158  “Unjustified entrenchment” is 
defined as when a party that “enjoys only minority support among the 
populace has nonetheless contrived to take, and hold legislative power 
[which] . . . is purely the result of partisan manipulation and not other 
 
 153. Id. at 354-55 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 154. Id. at 356 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 155. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 356 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 156. Id. at 357-59.  With non-random boundaries, under single member districts, a very small 
shift in the political climate – 49% Republican to 51% Republican – could change the 
government from 100% Democratic to 100% Republican. Id. at 357. 
 157. Id. at 360. 
 158. Id. 
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factors.”159  Such unjustified entrenchment leads to Constitutional violations of 
the Equal Protection Clause.160 
Justice Breyer’s plan for determining when unjustified entrenchment 
occurs was complex.  He proposed that the factors fall along a continuum, 
where the more entrenched the minority party is, the fewer indicia of abuse are 
required.161  For example, where few abuses are alleged but a majority party162 
twice fails to obtain a majority of seats and this failure cannot be explained by 
neutral factors, then there would be an unconstitutional entrenchment.163  
Further down the continuum, if the disadvantaged party can show more indicia 
of abuse and the majority party has once failed to obtain a majority of seats, 
then “[t]hese circumstances could also add up to unconstitutional 
gerrymandering.”164  Finally, Justice Breyer also saw an unconstitutional 
entrenchment when the indicia of abuse were extremely high (more than one 
redistricting in a decade, radical departure from traditional districting 
standards, or strong evidence that a minority will receive a majority of votes) 
but the actual entrenchment had yet to occur.165  This was based on his view 
that “the presence of a mid-cycle redistricting, for any reason, raises a fair 
inference that partisan machinations played a major role in the map-drawing 
process.”166 
The plurality dismissed Justice Breyer’s standard as too vague and 
unspecified.167  On his continuum, the plurality had trouble understanding 
where the line is drawn between an unconstitutional entrenchment and a 
constitutional entrenchment because Breyer stated the second scenario “could” 
be unconstitutional and the third scenario “may” be unconstitutional.168  The 
plurality appropriately felt this ambiguity left Justice Breyer’s test as too 
undefined to be judicially manageable.169 
Justice Breyer’s standard fails in providing guidance to lower courts.  His 
continuum is poorly defined and would make it difficult for a district court 
 
 159. Id.  Other justified factors include sheer happenstance, more than two major parties, 
Senate election scheme, or reliance on traditional districting criteria.  Id. at 360-61. 
 160. Id. at 362. 
 161. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 365 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 162. Justice Breyer defines a majority party as the party that receives the most votes actually 
cast in a race for its candidates in a particular race.  So the if the Republicans got the most votes 
cast for the U.S. House of Representatives in that state, they would be the majority party for that 
race in that state.  Id. at 366. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Id. 
 165. Id. at 366-67. 
 166. Id. at 367. 
 167. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 300 (plurality opinion). “In sum, we neither know precisely what 
Justice Breyer is testing for, nor precisely what fails the test.”  Id. 
 168. Id. at 299-300. 
 169. Id. at 300. 
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judge to determine when a violation has occurred.  Also, his requirement of an 
“unjustified entrenchment” makes the test too narrow.  There is as much 
danger in a majority creating a supermajority as there is in a minority holding 
on to power.170 
Vieth fails for many of the same reasons that Bandemer failed.  First, no 
opinion could garner a majority of the Court.  This leaves the lower courts 
unable to determine the appropriate approach to a partisan gerrymandering 
case.  The cases remain justiciable, as Bandemer is still good law on that point.  
No standard, however, is available for lower courts to use to make a 
determination on the merits of the case.  District court judges presented with a 
partisan gerrymandering claim must either dismiss the case because the facts 
do not meet the unknown standard, or choose or create a standard and apply it 
to the facts.  If a judge finds the district map invalid, the finding will likely be 
reversed for having chosen the ‘wrong’ standard.  Vieth fails because it 
provides no guidance for lower courts. 
Vieth also fails because it provides neither guidance nor limitations on the 
state legislatures.  The longer the Supreme Court fails to strike down a map for 
partisan gerrymandering, the bolder the legislatures will get in drawing the 
partisan maps.  Every election that is predetermined by a gerrymandered map 
violates a citizen’s right to vote and right to equal protection.171  Furthermore, 
the more partisan the map, the more partisan the individuals elected.  On both 
sides of the aisle, more extreme individuals will be elected, resulting in a major 
gap in the political middle, where most Americans actually reside.172 
C. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry 
In League, the Court again failed to reach a majority on any significant 
issue with regards to partisan gerrymandering.  Majority consensus only 
existed as to the scope of the issue—that the opinion does not address the 
question of justiciability.173  Partisan gerrymanders are justiciable,174 but 
disagreement remains over any substantive standard to apply.175  League 
addressed two issues of partisan gerrymandering: 1) whether redistricting mid-
 
 170. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
 171. See infra pp. 33-34. 
 172. Dann, supra note 7. 
 173. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2595, 2607 (2006). 
 174. Bandemer is still the applicable case law because no majority has overturned it.  Id.  
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Alito give no opinion on the issue of justiciability, as it was not 
argued in this case.  Id. at 2652 (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  Since 
both of the recently departed justices (Rehnquist and O’Connor) supported non-justiciability in 
Vieth, it is doubtful that a majority would have formed declaring partisan gerrymandering as non-
justiciable. 
 175. Id. at 2607 (majority opinion). 
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decade violates the Constitution, and 2) what standard should be applied to 
determine an unconstitutional partisan gerrymandering.176 
1. The League plurality opinion177 
The plurality stated that the Constitution allocates the primary 
responsibility of drawing district maps to the states and their legislatures.178  
Only in necessary circumstances, such as a failure to comply with the one 
person-one vote requirement or because of an imminent election, should 
federal district courts be saddled with the “unwelcome obligation” of drawing 
a district map.179  The act is unwelcome because it is one of the most 
significant acts of a state in ensuring the rights of citizens in the voting 
process.180  Importantly, there is no constitutional or Congressional ban on a 
state legislature redrawing a district map to replace a map previously drawn by 
either the legislature or a federal court.181  Furthermore, there is no 
presumption of impropriety placed upon a legislature that chooses to redraw a 
judicially drawn map in the middle of the decade.182 
The plaintiffs presented a standard similar to the standard presented by 
Justice Stevens in his dissent in Vieth.183  The plaintiffs modified Justice 
Stevens’ predominant intent standard by placing a presumption of invalidity on 
a mid-decade redistricting plan.184  The focus of the plaintiffs’ query was not 
necessarily the district lines but the choice to redistrict in itself.185 
The Court rejected the circumstance of mid-decade redistricting as tipping 
the balance toward unconstitutionality.186  There is no presumption that a mid-
decade redistricting is unconstitutional.187  Furthermore, it is an anathema to 
rule that a highly partisan redistricting that coincides with the census would be 
constitutional, while a less effective mid-decade partisan gerrymander would 
be unconstitutional.188  This rule would likely lead to partisan excess at the 
beginning of each decade, accompanied by minority toe-dragging because 
 
 176. Id. 
 177. Opinion by Kennedy which is joined by Souter and Ginsburg, and in which Roberts and 
Alito concurred in the judgment.  Id. at 2604. 
 178. Id. at 2607-08. 
 179. League of United Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2608 (citing Wise v. Lipscomb, 
437 U.S. 535, 540 (1978)). 
 180. Id. 
 181. Id. 
 182. Id.; but see infra pp. 33-35. 
 183. See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 336 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting); supra Part 
III.B.4. 
 184. League of United Latin American Citizens 126 S. Ct. at 2609. 
 185. Id. at 2609. 
 186. Id. at 2610. 
 187. Id.; but see infra text accompanying notes 252-257. 
 188. League of United Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2610. 
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opposition leaders may feel they have a better chance with the judiciary than 
by negotiating with the majority.189 
Finally, the Court stated that a partisan gerrymander by the majority is 
more appropriate than one conducted by a minority.190  While there is no 
requirement of proportional representation, the Court felt that there is less of a 
problem when a statewide majority takes a more substantial share of 
Congressional seats that when a statewide minority holds the majority of 
seats.191 
The Court also dismissed a standard for symmetry proposed by one of the 
amici briefs.  Under this symmetry standard, the court would look at how well 
the minority party would fare if the votes were equal.192  For example, under 
Plan 1374C, Republicans would have an eight seat advantage if the votes for 
statewide office were 50%-50% between Democrats and Republicans.193  This 
advantage would violate the symmetry standard because there was a significant 
deviation from proportionality even when one party did not dominate the vote 
statewide.194  The Court correctly pointed out that the degree of asymmetry 
depends “on conjecture about where possible vote-switchers will reside.”195  
Even if this problem could be solved, the Court did not feel comfortable 
determining constitutionality based on hypothetical situations.196  Furthermore, 
the symmetry standard proposed by the amici brief did not specify how much 
deviance is too much.197  Because of these problems, the Court elected not to 
use the symmetry standard.198 
The plaintiffs also argued that mid-decade redistricting for purely partisan 
purposes violates the one person-one vote requirement established by Baker v. 
Carr.199  The standard is based on the fact that since people move within the 
state, districts that are equal in population in 2000 will not remain equal.  
 
 189. Id. at 2611. 
 190. Id. at 2610. 
 191. Id. 
 192. Id. at 2610-11. 
 193. Twenty seats out of thirty-two total seats.  Id. at 2637 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part). 
 194. League of United Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2637 (Stevens, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
 195. Id. at 2611 (plurality opinion). 
 196. Id. 
 197. Id.; but see id. at 2638 n.9 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).  It is up 
to the Court and not social scientists to determine the amount of deviance, but 10% does not seem 
like an unreasonable number. Id. 
 198. Id. at 2611 (plurality opinion). 
 199. Id.  It should also be noted that Judge Ward of the district court would have granted 
relief under this one person-one vote theory on remand, when it was first argued, if he was not 
constrained by the Supreme Court’s direction to consider the case only in light of Vieth.  Id. at 
2607; Henderson v. Perry, 399 F. Supp. 2d 756, 784-85 (E.D. Tex. 2005). 
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“[P]opulation variances in legislative districts are tolerated only if they ‘are 
unavoidable despite a good-faith effort to achieve absolute equality, or for 
which justification is shown.’”200 
Plaintiffs argued that the legal fiction that population data remains accurate 
throughout the decade applies only when such a fiction promotes important 
state interests.201  Such important interests include avoidance of constant 
redistricting and the ensuing instability (when applied to a decennial plan years 
after it has been enacted) and compliance with the Constitution and voting 
rights legislation (when applied to a belated court-drawn plan drawn a few 
years after the census).202  This standard would require a legislature to justify 
its mid-decade redistricting “when there was no legal compulsion” to 
redistrict.203  Under this standard, the Texas legislature would be unable to 
justify their mid-decade redistricting because the motivation behind the 
voluntary redistricting was to achieve partisan goals.204 
The Court characterized this argument as the same argument that mid-
decade redistricting, is per se unconstitutional.205  The Court dismissed the 
argument for the same reasons it concluded that there is no inference that mid-
decade redistricting is unconstitutional.206 
Without the use of an inference, the plurality is left in its self-created 
purgatory of stating that partisan gerrymandering may be unconstitutional but 
without any standard to determine when and how such a decision will be made.  
Without an appropriate standard submitted, the Court merely affirmed that the 
facts do not meet some standard, whatever that standard may be.  The 
plurality’s opinion once again failed to provide any guidance to lower courts or 
any limitations on state legislatures. 
2. Justice Stevens’ dissent207 
Justice Stevens dissented, as he believed that the state violated its duty to 
govern impartially.208 
 
 200. League of United Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2611 (quoting Karcher v. 
Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 730 (1983)) (emphasis added). 
 201. Id. 
 202. Id. 
 203. Id. at 2611-12. 
 204. Id. at 2606. 
 205. Id. at 2612. 
 206. League of United Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2612; see supra pp. 24-25. 
 207. Stevens is joined by Justice Breyer as to Parts I and II.  Both Justices concur with the 
Court in their invalidation of District 23 in Part III of the Court’s opinion.  League of United 
Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2626 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part). 
 208. Id. at 2626. 
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When a State adopts rules governing its election machinery or defining 
electoral boundaries, those rules must serve the interests of the entire 
community.  If they serve no purpose other than to favor one segment—
whether racial, ethnic, religious, or political—that may occupy a position of 
strength at a particular point in time, or to disadvantage a politically weak 
segment of the community, they violate the constitutional guarantee of equal 
protection.209 
Stevens first established his belief that the “maintenance of existing district 
boundaries is advantageous to both voters and candidates.”210  More than eight 
million Texans were put into different districts, and on the whole, the districts 
were less compact under Plan 1374C than they were under Plan 1151C.211 
Justice Stevens framed the issue narrowly as a question of first impression 
for the Court: “[W]hether it was unconstitutional for Texas to replace a lawful 
districting plan in the middle of a decade, for the sole purpose of maximizing 
partisan advantage.”212  The issue was not on the contours of lines on the map 
but on the decision to redraw the map in the first place.213  Since the issue was 
not about the map but about the decision to redraw the map, Stevens argued 
that it is undeniably within the judiciary’s ability to determine the motive 
behind the map.214  “[T]he presence of midcycle redistricting, for any reason, 
raises a fair inference that partisan machinations played a major role in the map 
drawing process.”215  The case at hand clearly supported that such a 
determination is feasible because the district court, in fact, had made such a 
determination.216 
Upon concluding that it was within the purview of the district courts to 
determine when mid-decade redistricting is motivated solely by partisanship, 
Justice Stevens turned to whether such a motivation is sufficient to establish a 
constitutional violation.217  Distinguishing League from Upham v. Seamon,218 
Justice Stevens concluded then that the decision to redistrict solely to 
 
 209. Id. at 2641 (quoting Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 748 (1983) (Stevens, J., 
concurring)). 
 210. Id. at 2626. 
 211. Id. at 2630. 
 212. Id. at 2631 (internal quotes omitted). 
 213. League of United Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2631-32. 
 214. Id. at 2632. 
 215. Id. (quoting Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 367 (2004) (Breyer, J., dissenting)). 
 216. Id.  “There is little question but that the single-minded purpose of the Texas Legislature 
in enacting Plan 1374C was to gain partisan advantage.” Session v. Perry, 298 F. Supp. 2d 451, 
470 (E.D. Tex. 2004). 
 217. League of United Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2633 (Stevens, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
 218. Id. at 2633-34; but see Upham v. Seamon, 456 U.S. 37 (1982) (Upham stands for the 
proposition that a legislature is authorized to redraw a court-drawn map only when the district 
court has exceeded it remedial authority). 
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maximize partisan advantage and without any justifiable state interest violates 
the state’s duty to govern impartially, established by the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments.219 
3. Part III of Justice Stevens’ Dissent220 
According to Justice Stevens, not only was drawing the map mid-decade 
unconstitutional, but this map would be unconstitutional if drawn at the start of 
a decade.221  In an attempt to again put forth judicially manageable standards 
for the lower courts to follow, Justice Stevens supported use of the symmetry 
standard.222 
As stated above, the symmetry standard compares the number of votes 
statewide for each party as compared to the number of seats elected.223  “The 
symmetry standard requires that the electoral system treat similarly-situated 
parties equally, so that each receives the same fraction of the legislative seats 
for a particular vote percentage as the other party would receive if it had 
received the same percentage.”224  After starting with base numbers from an 
election, the numbers of statewide votes are then varied to determine how 
many seats each party would receive with a higher or lower percentage of 
statewide votes.225  According to the amici brief and experts for both the 
plaintiff and the state, Republicans in Texas would likely be able to carry 
twenty-two of thirty-two seats with only 52% of the vote, and they could carry 
twenty seats with as little as 49% of the statewide vote.226  Justice Stevens 
proposed that a symmetry deviation227 over 10% should be enough to shift the 
burden to the State to defend the plan.228 
 
 219. League of United Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2634.  The Fourteenth 
Amendment prohibits invidious discrimination and requires state action to be supported by a 
legitimate state interest, while the First Amendment protects citizens from official retaliation 
based on political affiliation and also prevents the State from penalizing citizens because of their 
political participation or beliefs.  See Vieth, 541 U.S. at 314 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
 220. Not joined by Breyer.  League of United Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2626. 
 221. League of United Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2635 (Stevens, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
 222. Id. at 2636. 
 223. Id. at 2636-37. 
 224. Id. at 2637 (internal quotes omitted). 
 225. Id. 
 226. Id. at 2636-37.  The data relied on is from Professor Gadie, the state’s expert in the case.  
Id.  In the 2006 election, Republicans received 47% of the statewide vote for U.S. House of 
Representatives, yet still won nineteen of the thirty-two seats.  CNN.com, America Votes 2006 – 
Texas, http://www.cnn.com/ELECTION/2006/pages/ results/states/TX/ (last visited Feb. 10, 
2007). 
 227. A symmetry deviation is created by comparing the percentage of seats each party would 
receive if each party had 50% of the statewide vote.  For example, under 1374C, the Republicans 
would win 62.5% (20 of 32) compared to the Democrats getting 37.5% (12 of 32).  This would 
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Justice Stevens also emphasized that an effective partisan gerrymander 
affects more than the minority party’s ability to elect its candidates; it also 
limits the losing party’s role in influencing the elected candidate.229  In 
general, our electoral system expects the winning candidate to take the 
minority interest into account because the minority may later become the 
majority.230  On the other hand, when the district is obviously created to 
effectuate solely the interests of one group, “elected officials are more likely to 
believe that their primary obligation is to represent only the members of that 
group, rather than their constituency as a whole.”231  Furthermore, in this case, 
the Representatives may feel that they owe their success and access to the 
cartographers of the map and not to their constituents.232 
Justice Stevens concluded that it was clear that Plan 1374C placed a severe 
burden on Texas Democrats because the plan created nineteen to twenty-two 
safe seats for Republicans.233  The harm was more than hypothetical because 
the safe seats reduced the likelihood that Republicans occupying those seats 
would be responsive to the interests of Texas Democrats.  Therefore, Plan 
1374C, in both intent and effect, violated the state’s duty to govern impartially. 
Justice Stevens’ dissent provides both guidance and limitations.  In terms 
of the mid-decade redistricting, the inference of impropriety helps the judiciary 
determine when a violation has occurred, and it makes it more likely that 
partisan gerrymanders will be eliminated in between censuses.  The symmetry 
standard also provides a concrete formula to determine when gerrymandering 
becomes unconstitutional.  Again, this will help the judiciary in determining 
how much is too much and it will curb many legislative abuses. 
4. Other Dissents in League 
As stated previously, this case contained six different opinions.  The 
opinions of Justices Kennedy and Stevens spent the most time on the issue of 
partisan gerrymanders.  Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, preserved 
the principle that partisan gerrymandering may be considered a violation of the 
 
result in a symmetry deviation of 25% (62.5% - 37.5%).  League of United Latin American 
Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2638-39 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 228. Id. at 2639 n.9.  While a 10% deviation would work for larger states like Texas or 
California, a different standard may be needed for less populous states.  See infra note 268. 
 229. Id. at 2638-39. 
 230. Id. at 2639; see also Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 132 (“The power to influence the 
political process is not limited to winning elections.”). 
 231. League of United Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2639 (Stevens, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (quoting Shaw v. Reno, 509 U.S. 630, 648 (1993)). 
 232. Id. 
 233. Id. at 2640.  This statement remains true even though the Republicans only won eighteen 
seats in 2006, because one of the seats that the Republicans lost was District 23.  District 23 had 
to be redrawn after League due to violations of the Voting Rights Act. 
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Equal Protection Clause.234  Justice Souter did not work through his standard 
set forth in Vieth because there was no majority on either an acceptable 
standard or the overall unconstitutionality of Plan 1374C.235  He did, however, 
reject Justice Kennedy’s view that the process used in redistricting cannot play 
a role in the determination of constitutionality.236  Nor did he rule out the 
possibility that the proposed symmetry test may be used to establish an 
unconstitutional partisan gerrymander.237 
Justice Breyer also dissented in part on his own.238  He too would have 
rejected Plan 1374C on its face because of its risk of entrenchment of the 
Republican Party.239  Because the district map would give the Republicans a 
majority of seats even when they received a minority of statewide votes,240 
Plan 1374C violated Breyer’s standard as declared in Vieth.241  The State had 
not even attempted to justify the plan on any other ground other than partisan 
advantage.242  Therefore, the plan violated the Equal Protection Clause.243 
Chief Justice Roberts, joined by Justice Alito, concurred separately in the 
judgment in regards to partisan gerrymandering.244  As neither Justice had 
ruled on the justiciability of partisan gerrymanders, they took no position on 
the issue, as it was not argued in this case.245  They did concur in the Court’s 
disposition, that even if the case is justiciable, these plaintiffs had failed to 
state a claim on which relief could be granted.246 
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, reiterated his view from Vieth 
that partisan gerrymanders are non-justiciable.247  No party had yet put forth a 
judicially manageable standard by which to measure the constitutionality of 
partisan gerrymanders.248  He again chided the Court for disposing of the case 
 
 234. Id. at 2647 (Souter, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see supra Part III.B.5. 
 235. League of United Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2647. 
 236. Id. 
 237. Id. 
 238. Justice Breyer joined Justice Stevens as to Parts I and II of his opinion.  Id. at 2651 
(Breyer, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 239. Id. at 2652. 
 240. See supra text accompanying notes 195-196, 212-221. 
 241. League of United Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2652 (Breyer, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part).  See supra Part III.B.6; Vieth  v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 359 (2004) 
(Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 242. League of United Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2652 (Breyer, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part). 
 243. Id. 
 244. Id. (Roberts, C.J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 245. Id. 
 246. Id. 
 247. Id. at 2663 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) 
 248. League of United Latin American Citizens, 126 S. Ct. at 2663 (Scalia, J., concurring in 
the judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
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without either setting a standard by which to measure the claim or declaring 
these claims to be non-justiciable.249 
IV.  AUTHOR’S ANALYSIS 
In its decision in League, the Supreme Court failed once again in its 
responsibility to determine the constitutionality of partisan gerrymandering.  
The most disturbing aspect is the lack of guidance offered to lower courts.  
Partisan gerrymandering is in a perpetual state of purgatory.  District courts are 
left with no viable options.  The district courts cannot dismiss the cases as non-
justiciable because, as of today, the majority decision on justiciability in 
Bandemer is still applicable.  Yet the lower courts have no standard by which 
to judge the facts.  Any decision to invalidate a map will likely be reversed by 
a court of appeals or the Supreme Court because no defined standard currently 
exists. 
The current status of partisan gerrymandering cases is indefensible.  The 
Supreme Court must reach a majority on the issue the next time it comes up.  A 
failure to settle the law leaves all participants in the predicament of not 
knowing what the law is.  To quote former President Bill Clinton, “Strong and 
wrong [is better than] weak and right.”250  The most important aspect of these 
cases is for a firm majority decision to be made. 
A majority determination that partisan gerrymanders are non-justiciable is 
inappropriate.  It would settle the law in terms of the judiciary, but it would 
still leave legislatures with no boundaries or limitations.  The state legislatures, 
left to their own accord, cannot be trusted to adequately address the problem.  
Given the opportunity, a majority party (by number of seats) will do whatever 
it can to maintain and extend its majority. 
After League, there are no limits on the legislature.  In the extreme, a state 
legislature could redraw district lines before every election in order to assure 
greater success in that particular election.  District maps could be drawn to 
benefit or disadvantage specific candidates.  Opponents of judicial intervention 
will argue that if the electorate is dissatisfied with elected officials, then the 
people can vote them out of office.251  This argument fails because state 
legislatures not only draw district maps for the U.S. House of Representatives 
but also for the state legislatures.  In other words, state legislators control their 
 
 249. Id. 
 250. Peter Brown, ‘Strong and Wrong vs. Weak and Right,’ Jan. 15, 2007, 
http://www.realclearpolitics.com/articles/2007/01/strong_and_wrong_vs_weak_and_r.html (last 
visited Feb. 10, 2007) (quoting President Bill Clinton). 
 251. “There used to be a theory that gerrymandering was self-regulating. . . .  The idea was 
that the more greedy you are in maximizing the number of districts your party can control, the 
more likely it is that a small shift of votes will lead you to lose a lot of districts. But it’s not self-
regulating anymore. The software is too good, and the partisanship is too strong.” Toobin, supra 
note 12. 
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own districts.  A majority party that begins to lose popular support can 
maintain power by simply redrawing the lines.252 
Partisan gerrymandering is not merely a matter of politics; it directly 
implicates the peoples’ constitutional rights.  The right to vote and to have 
one’s voted counted is constitutionally protected.253 
The right to vote freely for the candidate of one’s choice is of the essence of a 
democratic society, and any restrictions on that right strike at the heart of 
representative government. And the right of suffrage can be denied by a 
debasement or dilution of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by 
wholly prohibiting the free exercise of the franchise.254 
By intentionally cracking and packing citizens into districts so as to make their 
individual votes meaningless, the state violates its citizens’ right to vote 
equally as much as violations of one person-one vote or racial gerrymandering 
violates those rights.  That one form of vote dilution (disproportionate 
representation) is unconstitutional while another form of vote dilution (packing 
and cracking) is valid strikes at the heart of absurdity. 
The current situation is clearly unsatisfactory.  League leaves the judiciary 
with no guidance and the legislature with no limits.  While ruling that partisan 
gerrymanders are non-justiciable would ease the burden on the judiciary, it 
would still leave the legislatures unrestrained.  Therefore, two issues must be 
decided: (1) When is it permissible for a legislature to redistrict; and (2) what 
standard should be used to determine when a partisan gerrymander is 
unconstitutional. 
League provided the Court with the new issue of whether a mid-decade 
redistricting is constitutional.  Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution provides: 
The House of Representatives shall be composed of members chosen every 
second year by the people of the several states, and . . . shall be apportioned 
among the several states which may be included within this union, according 
to their respective numbers . . . .  The actual Enumeration shall be made . . . 
every subsequent term of ten years, in such manner as they shall by law 
direct.255 
This section provides the constitutional basis for finding that districting should 
occur after every census and only after the census.  Mid-decade redistricting 
will not be unconstitutional in absolutely every case, but there should be a 
rebuttable inference that mid-decade redistricting is impermissible.  Therefore, 
 
 252. Regardless of whether the gerrymandering party is Republican or Democrat, a 
significant segment of the population will applaud the continual gerrymandering.  This strong 
sector of support may be enough to maintain a majority of seats, even if most other popular 
support is lost. 
 253. Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 555 (1964). 
 254. Id. 
 255. U.S. CONST. art. I, §2. 
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if there are legitimate reasons for redistricting in the middle of the decade, such 
as a dramatic population shift or violation of one person-one vote, then 
redistricting could be allowed.  However, the burden will be on the legislature 
to prove that legitimate state interests are the basis for redistricting.  As the 
plurality pointed out in League, a presumption of invalidity for mid-decade 
redistricting could simply encourage partisan excess at the beginning of the 
decade.256  While this may be true, this presumption eliminates the worst-case 
scenarios.  The fact that this inference does not end all abuses does not mean 
that it should not be implemented to end some abuse. 
In addition to eliminating mid-decade partisan gerrymanders, the Court 
should implement a standard to determine when census-based redistricting 
constitutes a partisan gerrymander.  In Justice Scalia’s opinion in Vieth, he 
argued that eighteen years of Bandemer had proven that there was no judicially 
manageable standard.257  He stated that no majority was able to agree upon a 
standard and “the lower courts have [not], over [eighteen] years, succeeded in 
shaping the standard.”258  Since Bandemer, the lower courts, however, did not 
try to craft standards, but instead they applied the plurality standard from 
Bandemer.  It is not as Justice Scalia stated, that time has proven that no 
standard exists.  Time has only proven that the standard advocated by the 
plurality in Bandemer fails.  That standard proved to be too strict in its 
application, preventing any relief from being granted. 
The Court erred in Vieth and League by not providing a standard for the 
lower courts to implement.  While any proposed standard is unlikely to correct 
all partisan gerrymanders, an attempt must be made.  The status quo, as 
explained above, is untenable. 
In Bandemer, Vieth, and League, the dissenting Justices suggested a 
variety of approaches for an appropriate standard.  The use of any of the 
proposed standards, with the exception of the Bandemer plurality standard, 
would be better than no standard at all.  The best course of action, however, 
would combine aspects of several different standards. 
This proposed standard would follow Justice Souter’s burden shifting 
formula from Vieth.259  This standard, however, would not be limited to claims 
on individual districts.  Rather, the standard would apply to both single district 
claims and statewide claims.  The initial burden would be on the plaintiffs.  
They would be required to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that: (1) 
they are a member of a cohesive political party; (2) their individual district (or 
 
 256. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2610-11 (2006). 
 257. Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 277-281 (2004). 
 258. Id. at 279. 
 259. Id. at 347-352 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
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the entire statewide plan260) ignored traditional districting criteria, such as 
“contiguity, compactness, respect for political subdivisions, and conformity 
with geographic features such as rivers and mountains;”261 (3) the district (or 
statewide plan) was drawn so as to disadvantage their particular political party; 
(4) they would need to present the court with a hypothetical district (or 
statewide map) which deviates less from traditional districting standards than 
the actual district; and (5) the defendants acted intentionally to disadvantage 
their group. 
In regards to the statewide plan, the third and fourth requirements would 
use a modified symmetry standard as suggested by Justice Stevens in 
League.262  Justice Stevens suggested a 10% rule in regards to the symmetry 
standard.263  While 10% is an appropriate figure in states with a large 
population and a correspondingly large number of representatives, it fails in 
smaller states.  For example, in a state with five representatives, if both parties 
get exactly 50% of the statewide vote, it is not an unconstitutional gerrymander 
because the Democrats got 20% more of the seats (three seats to two seats).  
Therefore, in smaller states with ten or fewer representatives, the standard of 
deviation from equality must be a minimum of 10% and more than two 
representatives.264  Additionally, the map proposed by the plaintiffs must not 
unfairly discriminate against the opposing party. 
Once the plaintiff has met the prima facie requirements, the burden will 
shift to the defendants to defend the map based on legitimate state interests.  
The presumption of invalidity on the map is the same as the presumption of 
invalidity if mid-decade redistricting occurs.265  The presumption is rebuttable 
and may be defeated by evidence of legitimate state interests such as 
compliance with the Voting Rights Act,266 compliance with one person-one 
vote, proportional representation,267 or incumbent protection.268  This list is not 
 
 260. It would probably be impossible to show that every district in a statewide plan ignored 
traditional districting criteria.  Therefore, for the statewide plan, the plaintiffs would have to show 
that in general, the plan ignores traditional districting criteria. 
 261. Vieth, 541 U.S. at 348 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
 262. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 126 S. Ct. 2594, 2635-41 (Stevens, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
 263. Id. at 2638, n.9. 
 264. In a state with ten Representatives, where each party receives 50% of the statewide vote, 
but the Republicans receive six seats compared to the Democrats’ four seats, there would be no 
violation of the modified symmetry standard because there was not more than a two seat 
difference.  On the other hand, a state with nine Representatives that splits six-three with equal 
votes would violate the modified symmetry standard. 
 265. See supra text accompanying notes 256-258. 
 266. Bush v. Vera, 517 U.S. 952, 990 (1996) (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
 267. Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 754 (1973) (In Gaffney, the Supreme Court 
approved a Connecticut plan which advocated gerrymandering, but in proportion to each party’s 
percentage of statewide vote). 
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exhaustive.  The burden is on the defendants to show that the predominant 
rationale behind the map was not to disadvantage their political rivals.  While 
in every redistricting process there will be mixed motives, the defendants must 
show that their predominant intent was something other than political 
advantage.  The defendants’ rationale for the map must not be a mere pretext 
for political advantage.  Evidence to consider would include the legislative 
process (partisan or bipartisan), other maps proposed that also met state 
interests, neutral districting criteria, the shapes of districts, and the relative 
change from a previous map. 
If the defendants can show that the map is based on legitimate state 
interests, then the burden shifts one final time to the plaintiffs.  The plaintiffs 
must then show that the purported state interest is merely a pretext for partisan 
gerrymander—that the true purpose behind the map is partisan gerrymander, 
and that the purported state interest is met equally under the plaintiffs’ 
proposed map.  If the plaintiffs are able to meet this very difficult burden, then 
the state’s map should be thrown out. 
If a legislatively drawn map is deemed unconstitutional, the court may 
implement any of the following remedies.  The court may send the map back to 
the legislature one time to be redrawn, subject to the approval of the court 
before it is implemented.  If time does not permit the first option or if the 
legislature fails to draw an appropriate map, the court may implement the 
plaintiffs’ suggested map, if the map is appropriate.  Lastly, the court may 
create its own map, keeping in mind constitutional requirements, legitimate 
state interests, and neutral districting criteria.  Once a map has been approved 
by the court, that map should remain in place until the next census period.  The 
legislature may petition the court to change the map prior to the next census 
but only if constitutional requirements or legitimate state interests require it. 
Like any theoretical plan, this proposed standard would prove imperfect.  
Appropriate changes may be required in the future.  The lack of perfection, 
however, should not prevent the implementation of the standard.  The status 
quo of partisan gerrymandering is intolerable and must be changed.  The 
Supreme Court must no longer abdicate its responsibility.  It must end these 
current practices and implement an appropriate standard. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Gerrymandering for purely partisan purposes is a violation of the 
Constitution.  The Constitution provides for all citizens to get an equal vote.  
By partisan gerrymandering, the politicians have taken away the right to vote 
for the U.S. House of Representatives for many Americans.  Three separate 
 
 268. For a discussion on the legitimacy of incumbent protection as a legitimate constitutional 
goal see Walter M. Frank, Help Wanted: The Constitutional Case Against Gerrymandering to 
Protect Congressional Incumbents, 32 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 227 (2006). 
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bodies—the judiciary, Congress, and the state legislatures—have the capacity 
to restore the power to the people.  It is foolhardy to expect the legislative 
branches to advocate reform, as they are the primary perpetrators.  As is often 
the case, responsibility to remedy this injustice falls on the judiciary.  Over the 
past twenty-five years, the Supreme Court has failed in its responsibility.  The 
Court’s inability to reach a consensus on an appropriate standard to determine 
when a partisan gerrymander becomes unconstitutional is inexcusable.  As 
computer software and demographic information becomes more sophisticated 
and specific, no amount of informed voter discontent will be able to dislodge 
the unconstitutional gerrymanders.  Without action by Congress, the state 
legislature, or the Supreme Court, elections will no longer be decided by 
Americans; rather cartographers will elect the people’s House. 
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